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I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
I delivered the Foley Lecture in March, 2008, at a time when the dominant 
issues were the defaults in the subprime market and the recent failure and partial 
bailout of Bear Stearns. I thought it was appropriate to warn about the various 
pitfalls in the proposed remedies for the mortgage markets, and to discuss the 
larger implications of these developments, including what turned out to be an ill-
conceived stimulus package that was shortly thereafter passed into law.  At that 
time, it was clear that no one believed that we had gotten close to the bottom, and 
we braced ourselves for more. Still, no one, myself included, had any conception 
of how deep that bottom would turn out to be.  If anyone had suggested that, seven 
months later, none of the Wall Street investment banks would have survived in 
their current form, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would have gone bankrupt, 
and that a $700 billion bailout would have been thought the smallest amount 
necessary to stop the bleeding in the stock market, he or she would have been 
dismissed as a reckless pessimist.  All of those events, and more, have come to 
pass.  The crisis engulfed a Presidential campaign and the inarticulate responses on 
all sides have intensified the risks at home and abroad.  I have not sought to redo 
this lecture to indicate at various places why its gloomy predictions turned out to 
be all-too correct in anticipating the decline, even if they underestimated its extent.  
                                                          
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; The Peter and 
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution.  This lecture is a revised version of the lecture 
that I delivered at Pepperdine Law School on March 27, 2008.  Some interstitial comments were added 
as late as January 15, 2009. 
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But it is worth noting that none of this will be reversed unless and until we take 
seriously the “iron laws” to which I referred.  No government can redistribute the 
wealth that it systematically destroys.  No person or firm can continue to take high-
risk bets on the foolish hope that long shots will win enough of the races to make 
the game worth playing. And, last of all, no one can think that “the government” 
can socialize the losses which it has helped to bring about.  Lord knows what 
desperate measures will stabilize the current crisis. But, for the long term, only the 
following prescription has a chance of success: Fundamentals matter.  Keeping the 
government focused on the security of transactions and minimizing the use of 
government subsidies and government penalties offers the last slim hope of 
righting a sinking ship. Our basic collective attitude is that we can stabilize 
markets through collective intervention.  It works, sort of, on a lot of occasions. It 
generates catastrophic consequences on a few indelible occasions.  The first round 
of revisions of this paper was completed on October 6, 2008, with the stock market 
down 779 points at its low, and 376 points at its closing.  The last round was done 
on January 15, 2009, where the Dow Jones was up 13 points, after being down 200 
points at midday.  Progress of a sort, surely.  Please forgive the air of unreality that 
hovers over a lecture that sought to give a pointed warning, but turns out not to 
have been alarmist enough. 
II. LECTURE 
I would like to thank Grant Nelson for his kind introduction.  We have both 
worked for years on the real estate finance issues that have come to a head in the 
recent subprime crisis, and we had the pleasure of disputing a complex point of 
mortgage law in the recent Conference held in honor of his close friend and long 
time collaborator, Professor Dale Whitman of the University of Missouri.1  The 
subprime crisis has migrated from the inside pages of the business section to the 
front page.  Indeed, it is precisely because the topic has received such nonstop 
publicity that it is necessary to return to fundamentals to understand the origins of 
the crisis and some possible ways to mitigate its harsh effects, many of which are 
regrettably beyond recall.  In this connection, I often think back to Casablanca. It 
is fun to talk about kisses and sighs, but if you recall Sam’s famous song, the 
fundamental things still apply as time goes by.  And so it is.  Modern finance law 
has affixed many bells and whistles to the simple home mortgage.  But the only 
way to unpack the current situation is to begin with the critical relationship of debt 
to equity.  The more adventurous financing devices all share one characteristic: 
they are more vulnerable in bad times than the more modest arrangements in more 
modest times.  So let us begin with a primer on the iron laws of debt.   
A. The Iron Laws of Debt  
The first principle to keep firmly in mind is that whenever you have debt, 
                                                          
1 See, Grant Nelson, The Foreclosure Purchase by the Equity Redemption Holder or Other Junior 
Interests: When Should Principles of Fairness and Morality Trump Normal Priority Rules?, 72 MO. L. 
REV. 1259 (2007). 
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you have leverage.  Leverage makes the good times better and the bad times worse. 
If you think back to the fairy tale, leverage is like the little girl, who when she was 
good, she was very, very good, but when she was bad, she was horrid.  Quite 
simply, with leveraged transactions, you either do very well or very badly.  And it 
is a tribute to the frailties of human nature to think that the good times will 
continue to roll, until they don’t—when you are done in by your earlier optimism, 
which you have since come to regret. 
So how does leverage work?  It is not rocket science.  To give a simple 
numerical example, suppose you want to buy a building for $100. You can put 
down $10 of your own cash and borrow $90 from somebody else.  In so doing you 
have paid for the full price, but only by placing a lien on the property.  This simple 
transaction could be perfectly sensible.  Just think of the risk characteristics of two 
types of investments. Some people like to hold the debt position which promises a 
relatively secure return at lower risk.  Other persons, who have greater control of 
the project, may be prepared to take a greater risk in the hope of realizing a higher 
rate of return.  The division of assets could leave both parties better off.  So with 
property values stable or rising, the arrangement is stable. What does that mean?  It 
means that if your property increases in value by 10%, you, as the holder of the 
equity—the sum equal to the value of the property less the liens on it—will see the 
value of your equity double from 10 to 20—a very impressive rate of return.   
What happens to the creditor?  In this scenario, he turns out to be the 
tortoise.  He will enjoy a fixed rate of return before the increase in price.  And he 
will enjoy the identical return after the increase in price.  He has a larger cushion 
against the downturn, which makes his position less risky.  But in the short term he 
cannot capture any of the appreciation.  So he is better off than before, but his 
fraction of the gain is small relative to that of the equity holder whose value has 
doubled.  Do not rejoice, however, for we must never lose sight of the second part 
of the fairy tale: when she was bad, she was horrid.  How horrid?  Just assume that 
the value of the underlying property does not go up by $10.  Instead, it goes down 
by $10.  At this point, we must note one of the fixtures of mortgage law, which is 
the principle of absolute priority.  Put otherwise, that slow moving tortoise that 
gets first dibs on the property, so when its value goes down $10, the creditor is still 
whole.  But as a first approximation, the equity goes from 10 to zero, wiping out 
the high flier.   
 These ratios and the rules of leverage constitute the iron law of finance: if 
you want to reduce your risk on the downside, you have to accept a reduced return 
on the upside.  So if you had put down $20 and borrowed $80, that $10 property 
loss still leaves you in the game with $10.  By the same token, now the $10 
increase doesn’t yield a 100% increase in profit, but only the 50% increase from 
$20 to $30. 
Beware: nothing anyone can say or do, by way of politics, invocation, or 
prayer will change how leverage operates.  It also tells you why the volatility of the 
real estate market matters.  Let the market be relatively stable and pokey and the 
smaller, more predictable, swings reduce the possibilities of both bonanzas and 
wipeouts.  All this is good, not only because of finance but because it allows us to 
sidestep the ticklish question of what happens institutionally once the equity is 
wiped out.  In that unwelcome event, the incentives switch.  The party who is in 
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possession of the real estate has no permanent interest in the property.  But the 
party with the sole economic interest is not in possession of the property.  That 
situation is unstable, so it is now imperative to get the defaulting debtor off the 
property or to restructure the deal so that he regains an interest in it, as by 
forgiving some portion of the loan. 
The situation is still more difficult for banks that do not hold single liens but 
rather possess many loans, all of which are subject to common economic pressures 
in bad times. For example, some local factor might prove highly advantageous or 
highly disadvantageous to the bank, so that the higher variation increases the risk 
of wholesale defaults, which could impair its position.  To counter that risk most 
finance people follow the principle of diversification, which says if you can take a 
portfolio of assets, including loans, and mix its components up, so that their 
characteristics are not positively correlated with one another, you will gain stability 
for the portfolio much like you can reduce riskiness by taking less leverage.  And 
what does this mean?  You have somebody who’s a local originator of the loan.  If 
that lender can ship the mortgage off into a national market, where it can be pooled 
with loans from other sources, an investor in that portfolio will in fact get, as it 
were, the good loans in Chicago and the bad loans in Los Angeles or vice versa.  
The riskiness in one loan from one location will tend to balance off those from 
another, leading to a more stable portfolio, or so the theory goes. 
In addition, this process of collection paves the way for a further process of 
securitization which offers additional advantages, at least if the portfolio manager 
knows how to run the game.  That manager takes these pooled mortgages to create 
separate tranches, such that some people get higher priorities and hence greater 
levels of protection than others.  After putting all loan instruments into a single pot, 
the agreements specify that the spigot first opens to A, then B and so on down the 
line.  Parties can then match their sliver of the pie to their taste for risk, or the time 
that they need the money. By creating tiers of mortgages within mortgages, some 
people receive triple A rating on the desirable faction of risky portfolios, while 
others pay less to take on far greater risk. Looking at this process from the ex-ante 
perspective, it is another way to assign risk to those who are in the best position to 
bear it. 
There is one large caveat.  No matter how these techniques are combined, 
they cannot eliminate the Achilles heel of all financial transactions.  If the 
underlying securities lose value, then the value of the divided interests lose value 
as well.  Diversification and securitization offer no immunity from losses, but only 
a way to manage risk.  This proposition is another iron law, like the law of 
leverage.  So beware of political solons who in running for public office at the 
national, state or local level announce that they can open the spigot wide to solve 
the problem of credit for high risk customers.  Better to think first that they have 
committed a genteel form of securities fraud.  Don’t listen to the details because 
the iron law remains that every financial arrangement that creates some advantage 
has an offsetting disadvantage. 
What then are the disadvantages for this diversification strategy, no matter 
how sophisticated?  Well the first point is that the prospect of resale influences the 
incentives of the original lender.  The lender who holds the loans it originates from 
has every reason to worry about their quality, which covers both the value of the 
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property and the credit worthiness of the borrower.  That last proposition is evident 
for loans that are “recourse,” that is, which allow the lender to pursue any and all 
assets of the borrower if the loan goes sour.  But it is also important even in the 
context of nonrecourse loans, which allow the lender to only look at the secured 
property.  The debtor with fewer assets is more likely to default than one who has 
sufficient wealth to ride out some short term misfortune.  Looked at in any way, 
however, the original lender’s concern with these risk factors is diminished if it 
knows that it is going to ship these loans off to a third person the moment the ink is 
dry on the mortgage papers.  After all, now the consequences will be borne by the 
multiple institutions that receive some slice of these papers after the usual drill of 
diversification and securitization.  It is hard to get the original lender to go 
overboard about quality when the losses are borne by the buyers and not by 
yourself.  So resale can easily lead to sloppier underwriting.  The same is true 
when some third person, like Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, steps up to guarantee the 
repayment of the loan, even if it does not purchase it.  The loan originator is more 
concerned with the solidity of the guarantee than the value of the collateral or the 
solvency of the borrower.  Government guarantors offer the greatest assurance and 
thus create the largest systematic risk. 
Now, there is a way to counter this: with oversight.  Ideally, the managers of 
the security pools need to rate the mortgages that they receive.  They have to insist 
that they can turn back mortgages from the pools if they don’t meet certain 
parameters.  The monitoring should therefore make it clear to the loan originator 
that it will have to keep that paper which should never have been issue at all.  But 
here is yet another of my iron laws: every time there’s a monitor, there’s a 
potential evasion.  The originators now have an incentive to game the system by 
making loans that look good under the stated parameters for repurchase, but which 
in fact are riskier than the purchasers know.  And if the criteria for repurchase are 
stated in advance, it is often easy for the astute lender to make loans that meet the 
tests even if they are of inferior quality.  There may be a way to beat some four 
point scale used by repurchasers by looking at some fifth variable, which the 
regulators miss, or misunderstand. After all, the originator can say rightly that it is 
not its business to volunteer information that potential purchasers don’t care to 
know.  So the mortgage paper is not quite as good as the purchasers would hope. 
There is no magic bullet to avoid that particular problem.  Indeed, the higher the 
volume, the deeper that the lender goes into the pool, and the weaker the securities.  
So we have identified the first problem with diversification.   
The second problem with diversification is that it is more difficult to achieve 
than might appear at first sight.  It is easy to think that risks are diversified when 
they are not.  What do I mean by that?  Well, think back to the earlier example 
where mortgages from one state are pooled with those from another to take 
advantage of these regional variations across locations.  But even if these risks are 
randomly associated by some measures, they could easily be correlated by others.  
We can be certain that certain shocks to the system will be positively correlated 
across large regions or, indeed, over the entire nation so that diversification will 
never be complete.  Thus a change in the federal rates of interest, or in the polices 
of Fannie and Freddie (both in serious disrepair) are risks that are system-wide. 
Congress is capable of nationwide blunders that hit California as hard as Illinois 
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and Texas.  Here is another iron law: There’s no way that any loan pool can 
diversify that system-wide risk.  Take the dangers of high leverage, serious agency 
costs (between originators and buyers), incomplete diversification, and in 
combination they spell trouble.  The initial models begin with a jaunty optimism 
borne of the high level of confidence in the new mathematical modeling 
techniques.  When they work with the initial round of loans, the political pressures 
combine to say, “Let’s do more.”  What the political forces forget is that the more 
that is done, the weaker the average quality of the loans within the portfolio. Loan 
quality goes down, leverage goes up, and lo and behold, without anyone knowing 
where or why, the portfolio succumbs to the law of averages.  The rates of default 
increase; the difficulties of foreclosure multiply.  The ability of securitized firms to 
renegotiate loans is limited because it is hard for one party to speak to so many.  So 
now when the subprime loans fail, what should be done? 
B. Tackling the Subprime Mess   
One reason why the subprime crisis reached such major proportions is that 
the financial network is so highly articulated that everything is dependent on 
everything else.  Therefore, when confidence breaks property moves down sharply 
in value.  So the market has all the symptoms of the absolutely standard bubble—
after it has burst.  But some clue to the right response starts with this simple 
question: what were the terms of the subprime mortgages that failed?  Well, 
frequently, the lender advanced the borrower the entire amount of the purchase 
price.  The common justification for this heroic position is the cushion for the 
creditor that comes in the anticipated appreciation in the underlying property.  Oh, 
yes, and remember the Brooklyn Bridge is now up for sale.  Of course, in some 
cases this proposition will pan out, so that the lender becomes the genius de jour. 
Play the leverage game at 99 to 1, and an increase 10%, translates into a thousand 
fold gain on the original investment—nice work if you can get it.  On the other 
hand, if the property goes down even an eyelash, the loan will crash.   
And crash it will, for all sorts of reasons.  The job market doesn’t always 
remain good, for example, or a foreign relations crisis appears.  Yet once a 
property goes “under water,”  no one can breathe because that equity value was the 
financial oxygen that keeps the lending market alive.  So what now?  It is not an 
easy set of choices.  Starting first with an individual underwater borrower. That 
property could be worth $90 on the market, but $110 to the borrower who has 
customized it in some way.  He might keep the mortgage alive.  But the more 
common situation is one where the property may be worth $90 on the market, but 
only worth $85 to the stretched borrower.  The former is a better bet for 
renegotiation but, given diversification, who can take the lead in negotiation when 
tiny fractional interests are spread across the globe? Who’s going to be the leader 
of the syndicate?  What sort of fiduciary duties does that syndicate leader have 
with respect to everybody else?  These are non-trivial problems that don’t 
frequently arise in good times.  But they start to dog lenders, loan purchasers, and 
guarantors in bad times.   
Yet even if that control problem is solved, we still have Lenin’s question: 
“What is to be done?”  Unfortunately, there is no obvious answer on the individual 
204 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. II:1 
 
case once the situation unravels.  If the borrower has equity in his house of, say, 
$50, and the house is worth $100, then the mortgage covers only half the value.  
The only way the borrower can trash the mortgagee’s interest is to trash his own.  
He has to reduce the value of the property below $50 so the first $50 of loss from 
destruction or neglect comes out of the borrower’s own pocket.  It’s only after the 
value of the property dips below the amount of the lien that the acts of the 
borrower damage the lender. A robust cushion thus protects the mortgagee from 
the self-interest of the borrower far more effectively than any legal rule.  The 
borrower gets all of the upside and all of the downside of any small move, so he’s 
going to behave very well.  Once the property is underwater, however, all too 
many borrowers are willing to neglect the property because they are playing with 
somebody else’s money, not their own.  The debtor in possession after default 
creates an acute conflict of interest because now the party who controls potential 
expenditures is not the party who bears the loss.  In the language of economics, 
this position creates a huge externality that never quits no matter how sophisticated 
the arrangement.  So, back to Lenin.  What is to be done?   
It is critical to think long and hard about the possible alternatives.  Two 
courses of action are most likely when the lender holds all the cards. The first of 
them is to continue the dance; the second is to call the dance to an end.  How do 
you start to continue a dance and why might you want to do it?  Well, one of the 
reasons why you’d want to continue to let the debtor remain in possession is that 
foreclosures are a real drag.  The lender has to go through all sorts of procedures to 
remove the borrower from the premises.  That turns more difficult than it seems, 
especially if there are more than two players in the mix, which often happened 
with home equity loans.  Thus property that was purchased for a $100 with $2 
down could go up to $125 only for a second lender to make a second loan for 
another $25.  So now the first lender need not just get rid of the original tenant, it 
also has to contend with the position of the second mortgagee.  And of course 
some original owners had to leave town, so they let the property to a tenant who is 
not liable on either mortgage.  So what should be done with the tenant who, for 
good measure, may not know about either or both mortgages? The large number of 
moving parts sows confusion that slows down the process of repossession or 
renegotiation, for neither the second mortgagee nor the tenant can just be ignored.   
It is now time for another iron law of real estate finance.  The greater the 
number of parties who are necessarily locked in a deadly embrace, the higher the 
transaction costs to unravel the mess.  So it’s not at all clear that the original lender 
wants to keep the loan alive.  And no first mortgagee will write down the value of 
his lien by $25 so as to make it possible for the second mortgagee to collect on his 
loan.  The process can easily get frozen, as banks decide whether to foreclose, to 
refinance over a longer period of time, to take new collateral, and the like.  But in 
many cases a responsible lender who knows of the fragmented condition of the 
title will say in light of its fiduciary duty to its shareholders that foreclosure is the 
preferred alternative even if the borrower is thrown out into the street.  The only 
way to minimize loss is to get the underwater debtor off the property.   
We thus come to yet another iron law of economics.  Once the value of the 
property has gone down, its value cannot be revived by altering the arrangements 
between the borrower and his multiple mortgagees.  Supply and demand determine 
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property values.  All the lender can do is use foreclosure to get, if allowed, a clean 
title to allow the property to reenter the market.  Government intervention may 
make this person richer and that person poorer, but the value of the asset is 
determined by external constraints. Often the proper solution requires the first 
mortgagee to take over the property in order to create clean title so that it can be 
sold to a willing buyer at a price that might not equal the amount of the outstanding 
debt.  
Indeed, in some cases banks are prohibited from entering into non-lending 
businesses so they cannot even put in short-term tenants (at some risk, of course) 
to generate revenue while the property is being prepared for resale.  Yet to let the 
property lie vacant is to run the risk of creating a public nuisance that reduces 
nearby property values, and thus invites a possible seizure by the public authorities 
in response to complaints by neighbors.  One problem just leads to another.  And 
so, for the mortgagee, speed is of the essence, marked by quick foreclosure and 
quick resale, perhaps to individuals who are not as leveraged as their predecessors 
in title. How nice would it be to see a debt-equity ratio of 90 to 10, or better, 80 to 
20?  The lower prices allow the land to return to productive use.  We should not 
think, therefore, of the mortgagee turned owner as a sadist or despoiler.  Rather, we 
should allow first-home buyers to benefit from the crisis by getting into the market 
on advantageous terms. 
So what about the precarious position of the debtor?  Well, it’s one of the 
interesting features of these cases that by pushing the mortgage to its limits, it is 
not all that clear whether the “debtor” should be thought of as an “owner” or a 
“tenant”. The terminology can matter.  A tenant who is in default on his rent 
payments is subject to eviction. With no money down, those few monthly 
mortgage payments could be thought of rent.  The removal for nonpayment could 
be regarded as an eviction under a lease, not as foreclosure.  And there is no 
widespread public sympathy for tenants who have no paid their rent.   
But in some cases, the party in possession has made a small down payment.  
Just how does that change the analysis? Let’s assume this person has put very 
little, say $3,000, down on a $100,000 house, which is now worth only $80,000.  
Assume further that the party has lived in the house for a year and made mortgage 
payments of $1,000 a month. It is instructive to marry the down payment to the 
monthly payments.  The former is only 25 percent of the latter.  How, therefore, 
does this transaction differ from one in which the party in possession pays $1,250 
in rent before defaulting?  In fact the situation could be more dramatic if the 
foreclosure (or eviction) remedy is stalled for a few months while the party in 
possession pays nothing at all.  Thus if that lasts for 3 months on the numbers 
given, the situation is no different from a lease for 15 months at $1,000, followed 
by eviction.  The borrower has come out of this far better than the lender who has 
lost $20,000 over the same period, without any prospects of relief.  So put the 
matter in perspective.  If there is no special solicitude for the tenant who cannot 
continue to pay rent, why is it different for the borrower?  Note that this argument 
could apply in form to any case no matter what the size of the down payment.  But, 
in practice, those persons who have extensive equities and long standing mortgages 
don’t get themselves into the ticklish situations of highly leveraged borrowers.  
Their removal does not wipe out life savings.  It only sends them, in all likelihood, 
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back to an explicit rental market, where the large down payment gives way to a 
smaller security deposit.   
If there is one thing that should be clear, therefore, there is no great social 
premium in seeking to encourage homeownership that rests on rickety foundations, 
and once that is understood it is hard to take sides in the constant battle between 
borrowers and lenders.  It is yet another one of my iron laws that in most settings it 
is hard to pin the label of scoundrel on either landlords or tenants as a class. There 
are likely to be some scoundrels in both groups in any large population. Perhaps 
some of these ill-fated mortgages resulted from fraud in the inducement, for which 
the borrower should have some relief.  But shady lending practices look to be only 
a small fraction of the overall situation relative to cheap money and foolish 
guarantees.  In most cases, the real issue is getting out of the situation, and there 
are now kits available that allow the borrower/tenant to surrender the property by 
issuing a deed in lieu of foreclosure, which removes his claim from the property 
while releasing him from his obligations to pay back debt.  A quick deal and a 
clean solution, which works for the best of both sides, as the lender can now resell 
the property free and clear of all claims.  In some cases, a tenant from the borrower 
remains on the premises, and here resourceful banks can easily find that it is easier 
to offer “cash for keys” than to fight out an eviction proceeding, which again 
conforms to our view that quick solutions are best. 
Given the range of alternatives to this difficult conflict of interest, is there 
anything that the state can do which is better than a voluntary sorting out of these 
knotty problems under the law of foreclosure?  I think not.  This is a situation in 
which the maxim laissez-faire should be taken to heart, which is that government 
intervention in knotty situations should be regarded as an evil, unless and until it is 
proven to be a good.  In the absence of any dominant solution to the genuine 
conflicts between debtors and creditors, or landlords and tenants, it should be 
quickly apparent that injecting public moneys into the mortgage relationship is 
fraught with risk.  Any such intervention has heavy administrative costs.  Any such 
program is prone to errors, in consequence of which more people may engage in 
similar reckless behavior down the road, leading to yet a second foreclosure when 
the property is worth less than before.  State intervention does not have an 
impressive track record.  It is worth examining the pitfalls in a few of the common 
proposals.   
C. Credit Crisis Cures  
One of the proposals to ease the credit crunch is to take advantage of the 
interest rate differentials that are found in some mortgages, just as they are found 
in various credit card agreements.  The basic pattern runs as follows.  In the days 
when the Federal Reserve kept interest rates too low, one common arrangement 
allowed for borrowers to get the benefit of a low, or teaser, rate of interest at, say, 
5% a year.  In subsequent years that interest rate would go up substantially, say, to 
8% for the next several years.  The borrower was in a position to make the first 
year’s payment without difficulty, and planned to refinance the loan thereafter by 
taking advantage of another teaser rate from another lender.  I have no objection to 
borrowers accepting these arrangements.  But it was a fatal miscalculation for them 
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to assume that this same deal would be available next year as well.  But this 
scheme like all others cannot go on forever.  Once the value of the underlying 
property goes down, it is no longer possible to refinance the entire loan.  And once 
the interest rates climb back up, the borrower is hit with a double whammy. 
The proposal therefore is to eliminate the need to refinance by allowing the 
borrower to keep the teaser rates for an additional number of years.  Any bank, or 
syndicate, that chooses to make that decision in lieu of foreclosure is acting, of 
course, within its rights.  Although an external requirement that they extend the 
favorable interest rates may ease the problem of the borrower in the short run, it 
places a severe crimp on the ability of the banks to protect their reserves and 
remain solvent over the long run.  It also creates a huge valuation problem for 
securitized portfolios that can only hamper liquidity in the secondary market, 
making the liquidity crunch more severe.  It also seems like an important detail 
that moving in this direction will spell the end of teaser rates in all future 
transactions, so that those borrowers who can survive the higher payments down 
the road will receive less favorable offers than they get today.   
The situation is, in reality, worse than this.  Most people today tend to forget 
the financial dislocations in the 1980s when the courts in California invalidated the 
so-called due-on-sales clause which allowed the mortgagee to demand repayment 
of the loan on the sale of the property.  By calling these restraints on alienation, the 
courts allowed the buyer of the property to take over the old mortgage at highly 
advantageous interest rates.  The banks were denied the opportunity to renegotiate 
the loans at something between the old low rate and the high current one.  Without 
the fresh infusion of cash many of these banks teetered and others sought, and 
obtained, federal charters to escape the financial dislocations that resulted from the 
systematic devaluation of their entire loan portfolio.  The decision to suspend rate 
increases is a zero sum game.  What helps the individual hurts the holder of the 
paper. It is hard to see any social gain that follows from these dislocations.  It is 
easy to see how the injection of a new level of political uncertainty will lead to 
additional social losses. 
The adoption of these partial loan forgiveness schemes is often promoted on 
the premise that “nobody” pays when the bank is forced to forego interest 
payments.  That position, however, forgets yet another one of Epstein’s iron laws: 
no institution has ever got its penny of gain or a penny of losses in the history of all 
of western civilization.  Every single penny of profit and loss has to land ultimately 
on the shoulders of one or another individual.  Therefore, anyone who wants to 
figure out how institutions work must always follow the creed of methodological 
individualism, which means you trace cash flows down through institutions and 
entities to the balance sheets of the individuals who have stakes in their operation.  
Often it is difficult to run these calculations through Byzantine institutional layers.  
But only by making that effort can you correct the populist mantra that it is all 
right if banks (who suddenly have no shareholders and employees) lose so long as 
the people win.  This philosophical outlook is, in reality, a gross intellectual error 
tantamount to a form of securities fraud because it allows legislators to enact relief 
statutes without taking into account the inevitable tradeoffs that they require. 
Much the same can be said about public decisions to force a moratorium on 
mortgage foreclosures, which was one of the preferred remedies for the major 
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credit dislocations of the 1930s.  That approach would be correct if foreclosures 
were always the wrong solution, which they’re not.  It is important to remember 
what a moratorium does.  It leads to a precarious situation where property can 
deteriorate still further while in the hands of someone who is still underwater.  
Worse still, even after the delays, the foreclosure may still be necessary, at which 
time the property is likely to have deteriorated still further, so that the foreclosure 
is less effective than it otherwise would have been. There’s absolutely no reason to 
believe that the systematic waste of property works in the social interest, no matter 
how great its political appeal.  If, in fact, the dominant solution is to liquidate the 
losses and to start over again, any moratorium is far likely to do more systematic 
harm than good. 
The third solution is one that regrettably has become a constant of bailout 
practices more generally.  It starts with the assumption that the private lenders do 
not know how to manage their portfolios, which would be better handled by people 
who work in or under the supervision of the Fed. So the government takes over the 
portfolio from the private banks that have strayed from the straight and narrow.  
Often, however, the Fed will pay either face value for the paper, or some amount 
which is greater than its market value.  But the implications here are stark as well. 
It is an open invitation to follow the policies of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
urge banks to make unsound loans by offering to buy or guarantee their repayment, 
even though the government has little or no skill in managing distressed properties, 
which it may have to farm out to private parties who do.  The officials who run 
private banks are human, and if they are told that they can be sure to come out 
whole no matter how reckless their behavior, they will make risky loans which will 
be paid back by the government which is—remember methodological 
individualism—of course the taxpayers who are forced to pick up the tab.  In this 
world, you always get what you pay for.  And if you want to pay for improvident 
loans, those are what you will get, without having any clear sense of the size of the 
implicit subsidy created by the state action.  Private entrepreneurs do not have lofty 
social motives that will lead them to disregard temptation that government 
program cast in their paths. The Fed can do as much damage with unwise subsidies 
as it can with unwise regulations.  It is therefore time to remember yet another one 
of Epstein’s iron laws: No government can function well when it acts 
simultaneously as a market regulator and a market participant.  The confusion of 
roles will often lead it to favor its own business operations, at which point the 
private rivals are either driven from the marketplace or induced to follow socially 
undesirable policies.  There is no easy way out of the current predicament.  It is not 
as though clouds will lift, doors will be opened, and shutters will be painted.  
Further government intervention is likely to make matters only worse. 
D. A Global Solution?   
There is a larger lesson that follows from this analysis.  Once government 
intervention starts on the wrong foot, it is likely that one bad decision will lead to 
yet another, which could impact not only real estate transactions, but the fabric of 
American economic life.  Since there are no real solutions to the lost value of real 
estate, the temptation will be to make the problem disappear by taking more global 
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steps.  During the Great Depression, the great deflation made it impossible for 
borrowers to repay their loans with more expensive dollars.  The only painful 
solution was to reinflate the currency, with the consequent short term costs.  But 
that avenue was not pursued, which led to the rounds of mortgage moratoria, 
which helped the position of borrowers in the short term but created the intolerable 
pressures on the lending banks who could not meet the demands of their depositors 
who had the right to withdraw their funds at any time. 
In our present situation, the newer variation on macroeconomic responses is 
the stimulus packages that promises rebates to virtually all Americans in varying 
amounts.  The hope was, of course, that these funds would be used to make new 
purchases that would stimulate the economy.  The thought is that more of this 
money will go to the hands of lower income individuals who are on balance more 
likely to spend it on current consumption than rich people, if only because poorer 
people have a higher marginal propensity to consume. 
There are two objections here.  The first is that we cannot be confident that 
this prediction will be born out.  In practice many lower income people will use the 
money to pay off past debts or to replenish savings.  The second point is that it 
would not matter even if the prediction were true.  Even if every dollar were spent 
as advertised, these programs cannot—and in fact, did not—do anything to change 
the fundamental structural weaknesses in the mortgage sector.  The distribution of 
cash to many, or even all, American citizens does not create new wealth.  At best, 
it only creates additional paper claims against the fixed body wealth that is already 
there.  In practice, it is likely to do even worse.  Start with the administrative costs 
of redistribution that are a dead weight loss.  These costs are very heavy if the 
Treasury and other government departments are to discharge their mission to find 
all eligible recipients of the funds, including those who are not on the tax rolls. The 
population is always in flux. People become of age, die, or move without leaving a 
forwarding address. 
Next consider the question of who pays for the stimulus package.  In many 
cases it will be the persons who receive the money in question.  If there is new 
money printed it becomes the source of inflationary pressures.  If it is old money 
taxed from productive society members, their payments reduce the capital they 
have to invest in their own businesses.  The ephemeral gains on the buy side are 
matched by similar losses on the sell side.  Taken as a whole, the systematic 
uncertainty makes it hard to identify any probable winners from the program. 
There is a large lesson to learn from these episodes, which can be cast in the 
form of yet another one of my iron laws:  Governments can never use 
macroeconomic tools to solve microeconomic problems, just as they cannot use 
microeconomic tools to solve macroeconomic problems.  On the first point, the 
larger social programs cannot fix up the uncertainties in the mortgage market.  On 
the second point, no alteration in the rules governing mortgage foreclosures can 
deal with matters of inflation and price stability.  The constant effort to propose 
fixes in one area, to problems in another, will only make matters worse in both 
sectors.  The root difficulty with the subprime crisis remains that the collateral 
cannot support the loans.  The quicker one realizes the losses, the quicker the 
mortgage markets will regain their feet.  The sooner the government gets out of the 
loan stimulation business, the less likely this whole problem will recur. What is 
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needed in these cases is a systematic reform of the tax code which rationalizes the 
treatment for investments.  The short term gimmicks only divert energies from the 
proper reforms.   
So the question then arises, is there any way to save an industry from itself?  
On this score it seems evident that the subprime crisis cannot be confined to the 
banks, but covers all the institutions that do business with them, including the 
investment houses.  In these cases, it becomes exceedingly difficult to understand, 
let alone disentangle, all the obligations that any given firm has.  To allow the firm 
to utterly fail is to invite situations where other businesses suffer in their wake 
because they are counterparties to these failed institutions who cannot go through 
bankruptcy in six months to clear transactions that have to be closed today.  The 
task in these cases is to find ways to preserve the business in some fashion even if 
it is necessary to wipe out in large measure the existing shareholders.  The phrase 
“in large measure” does not mean “entirely”.  It means “largely.” And the reason is 
technical but real.   
The entire system of prioritization means that the shareholders of these firms 
hold subordinate positions, but these are positions that could benefit from a sharp 
upturn, so they are not worthless, even if they have to be assigned a specific value.  
Letting them be included in a reorganization in some small subordinate way is 
consistent with the underlying realities of the situation.  Allowing them anything 
close to full compensation is not.  The Bear Stearns plan was commendable, if it 
was commendable at all, solely because of the minimal compensation that it 
offered the shareholders whose position had deteriorated substantially within the 
previous year.  But the situation is perilous because of the fear that it will have to 
be duplicated by other transactions on a far larger scale.  It is very difficult for any 
responsible outsider to know what to do to fix the current problems.   
The blunt truth in all these cases is that it is easier to come up with a 
diagnosis of an ailment than it is to supply a cure.  The only point on which we can 
be confident is this: Right now, there is a deep division of opinion on the proper 
relationship of markets to regulation.  There are many individuals who see the 
current crisis as of March 2008 as the result of private greed.  There are fewer who 
see it as a complex interaction between mistaken public subsidies, unwise 
regulation, and private overconfidence in the various models that have been used 
to propel the investment houses.  The issues are hard enough to deal with even if 
the political dimensions are put to one side, but the conflicting viewpoints will 
lead, I fear, to a situation which will first reflect and then magnify those 
differences, so that much of what the government will do will aggravate matters 
rather than solve them.  
Our only hope is to return to the principles of people like Adam Smith, 
David Hume and Herbert Spencer.  For all their differences, they thought that 
government intervention was an evil until shown to be a good.  But we have long 
since exceeded the optimal size of government under this theory.  The question of 
whether we can understand that the risk of bailouts today leads to more serious 
risks of bailouts tomorrow is something that only the future can tell.  I am not 
confident, though, that the public psyche would support government agencies if 
they were to take the steps needed to limit the scope of the subprime crisis.  
